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Most of belief revision operations have been proposed for totally preordrered information.
However, in case of partial ignorance, pieces of information are partially preordered and
few effective approaches of revision have been proposed. The paper presents a new frame-
work for revising partially preordered information, called Partially Preordered Removed
Sets Revision (PPRSR). The notion of removed set, initially deﬁned in the context of the
revision of non ordered or totally preordered information is extended to partial preorders.
The removed sets are efﬁciently computed thanks to a suitable encoding of the revision
problem into logic programming with answer set semantics. This framework captures
the possibilistic revision of partially preordered information and allows for implementing
it with ASP. Finally, it shows how PPRSR can be applied to a real application of the VENUS
european project.
 2010 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
Belief revision has been extensively studied in the domain of knowledge representation for artiﬁcial intelligence, mainly
for totally preordered information. A characterization of belief revision has been provided by Alchourron, Gärdenfors,
Makinson (AGM) with a set of postulates that any revision operation should satisfy [22]. Katsuno and Mendelzon (KM)
reformulated AGM’s postulates and provided a representation theorem that characterizes revision operations based on total
preorders [30]. Belief revision has been discussed within different frameworks (probabillity theory, Sphon’s conditional
functions, Grove’s system of spheres, . . .) and several revision operations have been proposed like the possibilistic revision
[20,21] or adjustment revision [46], the linear-based revision [38], the natural revision [12], the lexicographic-based revi-
sion [1,37,34], the revision with memory [2,40], and more recently several works on iterared revision [10,28,11,19]. As
pointed out by Delgrande et al. [18], the different approaches proposed in the literature can be classiﬁed according to three
different points of view. Given a plausibility ordering on interpretations describing the background knowledge and a new
piece of information, belief revision as defeasible inference (BRDI) amounts to ﬁnd the most plausible interpretation satis-
fying the input information, belief revision as incorporation of evidence (BRIE), amounts to change the plausibility ordering
in presence of a new piece of information and belief revision of background knowledge (BRBK) means revising the back-
ground knowledge by a generic information.
In order to provide effective revision operations, strategies have to be chosen. When a new piece of information is incon-
sistent with the initial beliefs, the revision problem is related to the problem of consistency restoration. This problem has
been addressed according to three main families of approaches: construction of preferred consistent (or maximal consistent). All rights reserved.
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M. Sérayet et al. / International Journal of Approximate Reasoning 52 (2011) 110–126 111subsets of formulae [42,1,15], forgetting some variables responsible of the inconsistency [36,33,9], inconsistency minimiza-
tion [41,14,25,48].
Some approaches have been implemented [47,17], among them, Removed Sets Revision which has been initially proposed
in [48] for revising a set of propositional formulae. Contrary to consistency maximization, this approach stems from remov-
ing a minimal number of formulae, called removed set, to restore consistency. The Removed Sets Revision (RSR) and then a
prioritized form of Removed Sets Revision, called Prioritized Removed Sets Revision (PRSR) [8] have been encoded into an-
swer set programming and allowed for solving a practical revision problem coming from a real application in the framework
of geographical information system.
However in some applications, an agent has not always a total preorder between situations at his disposal, but is only able
to deﬁne a partial preorder between situations, particularly in case of partial ignorance and incomplete information. In such
cases, an epistemic state can be represented by either a partial preorder on interpretations or a partially preordered belief base.
The revision of partially preordered information has been less investigated in the literature, however Lagrue and cowork-
ers [6] pointed out that the KM’s postulates are not appropriate for partial preorders and proposed a suitable deﬁnition of
faithful assignment, called P-faithful assignment, a new set of postulates and a representation theorem. Some revision oper-
ations initially deﬁned for total preorders, such as revision with memory and possibilistic revision have been successfully
extended to partial preorders [4].
This paper proposes a new framework for revising partially preordered information and provides an efﬁcient implemen-
tation thanks to answer set programming. The main contributions of this paper are the following:
 It extends the Removed Sets Revision to partially preordered information, called Partially Preordered Removed Sets Revi-
sion (PPRSR). The paper shows how the notion of removed set, roughly speaking, the subsets of formulae to remove to
restore consistency, initially deﬁned in the context of non ordered [48] or totally ordered [8] information is extended
to the case of the revision of partially preordered information.
 It provides an implementation of PPRSR with ASP. The revision problem is translated into a logic program with answer set
semantics and a one-to-one correspondence between removed sets and preferred answer sets is shown. The computation
of answer sets is performed with any ASP solver.
 It shows that the possibilistic revision of partially preordered information can be captured within the PPRSR framework
allowing for an efﬁcient implementation with ASP.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 ﬁxes the notations and gives a refresher on the Removed Sets Revi-
sion (RSR), on answer set programming and on partial preorders. Section 3 presents the Partially Preordered Removed Set
Revision (PPRSR) and shows how it captures the possibilistic revision. Section 4 details the encoding of PPRSR into logic pro-
gramming with answer set semantics and the computation of answer sets thanks to ASP solvers. It then shows the one-to-
one correspondence between removed sets and preferred answer sets. Section 5 illustrates how PPRSR can be applied in the
context of the VENUS project before concluding.
2. Background and notations
2.1. Notations
In this paper we use propositional calculus, denoted by LPC, as knowledge representation language with usual connectives
:;^;_;!;$. Let X be a set of propositional formulae, we denote by Cons(X) the set of logical consequences of X. We denote
by W the set of interpretations of LPC and by Mod(w) the set of models of a formula w, that is ModðwÞ ¼ fx 2 W;x  wg
where  denotes the inference relation used for drawing conclusions.
2.2. Removed Sets Revision
We brieﬂy recall the Removed Sets Revision approach. Removed Sets Revision [48] deals with the revision of a set of prop-
ositional formulae by a set of propositional formulae.1 Let K and A be ﬁnite sets of clauses. Removed Sets Revision (RSR) focuses
on theminimal subsets of clauses to remove fromK, called removed sets, in order to restore the consistency ofK [ A. More formally,
Deﬁnition 1. Let K and A be two consistent sets of clauses such that K [ A is inconsistent. R a subset of clauses of K, is a
removed set of K [ A iff
(i) (KnR) [ A is consistent;
(ii) "R0 # K, if (KnR0) [ A is consistent then jRj 6 jR0j2.
Let denote by RðK [ AÞ the collection of removed sets of K [ A, RSR is deﬁned as follows:1 The initial approach considers propositional formulae in their equivalent conjunctive normal form (CNF).
2 jRj denotes the number of clauses of R.
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_
R2RðK[AÞ
ConsððK n RÞ [ AÞ:According to a semantic point of view, jNSKðxÞj denotes the number of clauses of K falsiﬁed by an interpretationx and a
total preorder on interpretations is deﬁned by:Deﬁnition 3. xi 6 Kxj iff jNSKðxiÞj 6 jNSKðxjÞj.
Removed Sets Revision can be semantically deﬁned by:
Deﬁnition 4. Let K and A be two consistent sets of clauses,Mod KRSRsemAð Þ ¼ min ModðAÞ;6Kð Þ:
It minimizes the number of clauses falsiﬁed by the models of A and ModðKRSRAÞ ¼ ModðKRSRsemAÞ. In case of prioritized
belief bases, RSR has been extended to Prioritized Removed Sets Revision (PRSR) [8].2.3. Partial preorders
A partial preorder, denoted by  on a set A is a reﬂexive and transitive binary relation. Let x and y be two members of A,
the equality is deﬁned by x = y iff x  y and y  x. The corresponding strict partial preorder, denoted by , is such that, x  y
iff x  y holds but x = y does not hold. We denote by  the incomparability relation x  y iff x  y does not hold nor y  x. The
set of minimal elements of A with respect to , denoted by Min(A,), is deﬁned as: Min(A,) = {x 2 A, 9= y 2 A:y  x}.
An epistemic state allows for encoding the agent’s beliefs but also for encoding its relative conﬁdence in alternative pos-
sible states of the world. Epistemic states can be represented by several means: preorders on interpretations [16,34], con-
ditionals [13,16], epistemic entrenchments [45,37], prioritized belief bases [2,3], . . . When focusing on representations by
means of preorders, epistemic states are generally represented by total preorders on interpretations, however, as mentioned
in the introduction, in case of partial ignorance, the agent is unable to compare all situations between them and a partial
preorder seems to be more suitable to represent epistemic states.
Katsuno and Mendelzon [30] proposed a set of postulates and a representation theorem that characterize revision oper-
ations based on partial preorders. However, the proposed approach is not satisfactory since only one class of partial preor-
ders can be revised [6]. In particular, the concept of faithfull assignment deﬁned in [30] is unable to represent all partial
preorders on interpretations. Let W be an epistemic state represented by a partial preorder on interpretations, denoted by
W and let Bel(W) be its corresponding belief set. An alternative deﬁnition of faithfull assignment, called P-faithfull assign-
ment, is proposed in [6] as follows.
Deﬁnition 5. Let BelðWÞ ¼ minðW;WÞ;W is a P-faifhful assignment if
1. if x, x0Bel(W) then x  Wx0 does not hold,
2. if x0 = Bel(W), then there exists x such that xBel(W) and x  Wx0,
3. if W =U then W =  U.
Moreover, [6] gives a set of postulates an operation  has to satisfy and a representation theorem such that Mod(Bel(W
l)) =min(Mod(l),  W). An alternative syntactic but equivalent representation of an epistemic state,W is a partially preor-
dered belief base, denoted by (R,  R), whereR is a set of propositional formulae, andR is a partial preorder on the formulae
ofR. Several ways of deﬁning a partial preorder on subsets of formulae belonging toR, called comparators, from a partial pre-
order on a set of formulaeR have been proposed: inclusion-based [29], possibilistic [5], lexicographic [49] comparators. They
are such that the preferred formulae are kept in the belief base. In our approach, according to the Removed Sets strategy, we
adopt a dual point of view in the sense that wewant to prefer the subsets of formulae to remove. For example, we rephrase the
possibilistic comparator (or weak comparator) used in [5], already deﬁned in [35] and reused by Halpern [26] as follows. Y is
preferred to X if for each element of Y, there exists at least one element of X which is preferred to it, more formally:
Deﬁnition 6. Let R be a partial preorder on R, Y # R and X # R.
Y is preferred to X, denoted by YEwX iff " y 2 Y, $x 2 X such that x  Ry.
We now brieﬂy recall the extension of the semantic possibilistic revision to partial preorders [4]. The semantics of pos-
sibilistic logic stems from the notion of possibility distribution [20], denoted by p, which is a function fromW, to [0,1]. p(x)
evaluates to what extent x is compatible, or consistent with the available knowledge. p(x) = 0 means that x is impossible,
while p(x) = 1 means that x is totally possible. p(x0)  p(x) means that x is more plausible than x0. A possibility distribu-
tion is said to be normalized or consistent if there exists an interpretation x such that p(x) = 1.
An epistemic state W is represented by ðW;WÞ where the partial preorder on interpretations  W is associated to a
possibility distribution as follows: 8x;x0 2 W;xWx0 iff p(x0)  p(x). The possibilistic revision of W by a propositional
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impossible and preserves the relative ordering between the models of l. More formally,
Deﬁnition 7. Wpl corresponds to the following partial preorder:
1. if x, x0 2Mod(l) then xWplx0 iff x  Wx0,
2. if x, x0 RMod(l) then x¼Wplx0,
3. if x 2Mod(l) and x0 RMod(l) then xWplx0.
2.4. Answer sets
A normal logic program is a set of rules of the form c  a1 , . . .,an,notb1, . . . ,not bm where c, ai(1 6 i 6 n), bj(1 6 j 6m) are
propositional atoms and the symbol not stands for negation as failure. For a rule r like above, we introduce head(r) = c and
body(r) = {a1, . . . ,an,b1, . . . ,bm}. Furthermore, let body+(r) = {a1, . . . ,an} denotes the set of positive body atoms and
body(r) = {b1, . . .,bm} the set of negative body atoms, and body(r) = body+(r) [ body(r). Let r be a rule, r+ denotes the rule
head(r) body+(r), obtained from r by deleting all negative body atoms in the body of r.
A set of atoms X is closed under a basic program P iff for any rule r 2 P, head(r) 2 Xwhenever body(r) # X. The smallest set
of atoms which is closed under a basic program P is denoted by CN(P). The reduct or Gelfond–Lifschitz transformation [24], PX
of a program P relatively to a set X of atoms is deﬁned by PX = {r+jr 2 Pandbody(r) \ X = ;}. A set of atoms X is an answer set of
P iff CN(PX) = X.
3. Partially Preordered Removed Sets Revision (PPRSR)
LetW be an epistemic state for partially preordered information and Bel(W) its corresponding belief set. W can be inter-
preted according either a syntactic or a semantic point of view.W is syntactically represented by (R,  R) where R is a ﬁnite
set of arbitrary formulae and  R is a partial preorder on R. Moreover, W can also be semantically represented as a partial
preorder on interpretations such that the models of Bel(W) are minimal with respect to this partial preorder.
3.1. The PPRSR framework
Revising partially preordered belief bases involves the deﬁnition of a partial preorder on subsets of formulae, called com-
parators [5,49]. We ﬁrst present a general framework, Partially Preordered Removed Sets Revision (PPRSR) without specify-
ing a particular comparator. We start with the syntactic approach then with the semantic one for revising an epistemic state
W by a formula l.
PPRSR Syntactic Approach. The original Removed Sets Revision was proposed for revising belief bases consisting of prop-
ositional formulae in conjunctive normal form, we now extend Removed Sets Revision to arbitrary formulae. Obviously, the
Removed Sets Revision of arbitrary formulae does not lead to the same results than the Removed Sets Revision of formulae in
CNF. However, only considering formulae in CNF, we loose the syntactic structure of the initial beliefs. Moreover, in some
applications, it does not make sense to only remove part of formulae to restore consistency. In [32] the approach concen-
trated to the construction of maximal consistent subbases from the initial belief base while our strategy is to focus on subsets
of formulae to remove to restore consistency. More precisely, our strategy is to determine the preferred subsets (with respect
to the initial preorder on formulae) to remove, called removed sets.
According to the syntactic point of view, the revision of the epistemic stateW by a formula l leads to an epistemic state
denoted by WECl and represented by a new partially preordered belief base ðRECl;REC lÞ where the partial preorderREC l is such that l is preferred to any formula of R and the relative ordering between the formulae of R is preserved. More
formally,
Deﬁnition 8. Let (R, R) be a syntactic representation ofW, the revision ofW by a formula l leads to the revised epistemic
state denoted by WECl represented by a partially preordered belief base RECl;RECl
 
where
 RECl ¼ R [ flg,
 REC l : ðiÞ8w 2 R;lREC lw and ðiiÞ8w; / 2 R;wREC l/ iff w  R /.
Since R [ {l} may be inconsistent, we have to provide the consistent belief set, denoted by BelðWEClÞ, corresponding to
the revised epistemic state. In order to syntactically compute BelðWEClÞwe focus on the preferred subsets of formulae, with
respect to the initial partial preorder, to remove from R, in order to restore consistency. We ﬁrst deﬁne the potential re-
moved sets as follows:
Deﬁnition 9. Let (R,  R) be a syntactic representation ofW. Let l be a formula such that R [ {l} is inconsistent. R, a subset
of formulae of R, is a potential removed set of R [ {l} iff (RnR) [ {l} is consistent.
Fig. 1. Partial preorder on formulae of R.
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b Ra. We revise R by l ¼ :a _ :b. R [ {l} is inconsistent. The potential removed sets are R0 ¼ fa; a _ :bg; R1 ¼ fa; a_
:b;:a_bg; R2 ¼ fa;b;a_:bg; R3 ¼ fa;b;a_:b;:a_bg; R4 ¼ fb;:a_bg; R5 ¼ fb;a_:b;:a_bg; R6 ¼ fa;b;:a_bg; R7 ¼ fa;bg.
Let RðR [ flgÞ be the set of potential removed sets. Among them, we want to prefer the potential removed sets which
allow us to remove the formulae that are not preferred according to R. This leads to deﬁne a partial preorder on subsets
of formulae of R, called comparator [5,49], denoted by EC. We now generalize the notion of removed sets to subsets of par-
tially preordered formulae. We denote by RCðR [ flgÞ the set of removed sets of R [ {l}.
Deﬁnition 10. Let (R, R) be a syntactic representation ofW. Let l be a formula such that R [ {l} is inconsistent. R # R is a
removed set of R [ {l} iff
1. R is a potential removed set.
2. 9=R0 2 RðR [ flgÞ such that R0 	 R.
3. 9=R0 2 RðR [ flgÞ such that R0/CR.Example 2. In the examples, we will use the weak comparator, denoted by Ew and deﬁned in Section 2.3. We have R0Ew R1
because a  Ra and :a _ bRa _ :b. The partial preorder on the potential removed sets is illustrated in Fig. 2.Remark. We could reﬁne the notion of removed set with an extra preference according to a strategy P (cardinality or mini-
mality).RC;PðR [ flgÞ denotes the set of removed sets ofR [ {l} according to the strategy P. In this case, a preferred removed
set according to a strategy P is a removed set R such that 9=R0 2 RCðR [ flgÞ such that R0 < PR. According to the cardinality,
RY 6 CARDRX iff jRYj 6 jRXj with jXj the cardinality of the set X. According to the minimality, RY 6 MINRX iff
jRY \MINj 6 jRX \MINj with MIN = {xjx 2 R, 9= y 2 R,y  Rx}.Example 3. We can apply strategies: Rw;CARDðR [ flgÞ ¼ fR0;R7g and Rw;MINðR [ flgÞ ¼ fR0g.
Stemming from the above notion of removed set, the belief set corresponding to the revised epistemic state, denoted by
Bel W EC l
 
, is deﬁned as follows:
Deﬁnition 11. Let (R, R) be the syntactic representation of W and let l be a formula, the belief set corresponding to the
revised epistemic state WECl is BelðWEClÞ ¼
W
R2RC ðR[flgÞConsððR n RÞ [ flgÞ.Example 4. According to the Example 1, W is syntactically represented by (R, R) and revising by l using the weak com-
parator gives:REwl ¼ fa; b; a _ :b;:a _ b;:a _ :bg;
BelðWEwlÞ ¼ Consðfb;:a _ b;:a _ :bgÞ _ Consðfa _ :b;:a _ b;:a _ :bgÞ and REwl as shown by Fig. 3.Fig. 2. Partial preorder on the potential removed sets.
Fig. 3. REw l .
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a partial preorder on interpretations such thatMod(Bel(W)) is minimal in this preorder. We now construct a partial preorder
on interpretations applying the comparator to the set of formulae of R falsiﬁed by the interpretations. Let x be an interpre-
tation, FR(x) denotes the set of formulae of R falsiﬁed by x. More formally,
Deﬁnition 12. LetW be an epistemic state syntactically represented by (R, R), the partial preorder CW on interpretations is
such that:8x; x0 2 W; xCWx0 iff FRðxÞECFRðx0Þ:Using this deﬁnition, the semantic representation of W is ðW;CWÞ and is such that ModðBelðWÞÞ ¼ minðW;CWÞ. We are
now able to deﬁne the semantic counterpart of PPRSR as follows:Deﬁnition 13. Let ðW;CWÞ be a semantic representation of W, the revision of W by a formula l leads to the semantically
revised epistemic state WEsemC l such thatMod BelðWEsem
C
lÞ
 
¼ min ModðlÞ;CW
 
:The revised epistemic state is semantically represented by W;CWEsem
C
l
 
, where CWEsem
C
l is a new partial preorder on
interpretations, as illustrated in Fig. 4a). This partial preorder is deﬁned from the sets of formulas belonging to R [ {l} fal-
siﬁed by the interpretations. More formally:Deﬁnition 14. Let RECl;RECl
 
be the representation of the syntactically revised epistemic state. The partial preorder on
interpretations CWEsem
C
l is such that8x; x0 2 W; xCWEsem
C
lx
0 iff FREC lðxÞECFREC lðx0Þ:
PPRSR agrees with the notion of P-faithful assignment and the following proposition holds.Proposition 1. Let W be an epistemic state and CW be a partial preorder on W associated to W. Then, CW is a P-faithful
assignment.
The proof of the Proposition 1 (provided in Appendix A) follows from the construction of partial preorder CW.
According to the Proposition 1, the revision operation semEC satisﬁes the postulates P1  P7 proposed in [6] that extend the
KM-postulates to the revision of partially preordered belief bases.
3.2. PPRSR in the case of the weak comparator
We now focus on the weak comparator Ew deﬁned in Section 2.3. We show that the semantic counterpart captures the
extension of possibilistic revision to partial preorders. Moreover, we reﬁne the semantic counterpart given in Deﬁnition 13,
in order to provide an equivalence between the PPRSR syntactic and semantic approaches.
When we select the weak comparator the PPRSR framework can capture the possibilistic revision, illustrated in Fig. 4b,
recalled in Section 2.3 and the following proposition holds.
Proposition 2. Let p be the possibilistic revision operator.
8x; x0 2 W; xwWEsemw lx
0 iff xWplx0:Fig. 4. The syntactic and semantic representation of the revised epistemic state.
Fig. 5. Partial preorders between interpretations.
Table 1
The sets of formulae falsiﬁed by the interpretations.
xi a b FRðxiÞ FR/xlðxiÞ
x0 :a :b {a,b} {a,b}
x1 :a b fa; a _ :bg fa; a _ :bg
x2 a :b fb;:a _ bg fb;:a _ bg
x3 a b h f:a _ :bg
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Deﬁnition 12 with the weak comparator, we construct a partial preorder on interpretations. The sets of formulae of R fal-
siﬁed by the interpretations is illustrated in Table 1 and the partial preorder wW is given by the Fig. 5a. Therefore ðW;wWÞ
is the semantic representation of W and is such that ModðBelðWÞÞ ¼ minðW;wWÞ ¼ fx3g.
Let ðREwl;REwlÞ be the syntactic representation of the epistemic stateW revised by l. Using the Deﬁnition 12 with the
weak comparator, we construct a new partial preorder on the interpretations. The sets of formulae of RECl falsiﬁed by the
interpretations are illustrated in Table 1 and the partial preorder WEsemw is given by the Fig. 5b. Therefore W;
w
WEsemw l
 
is
the semantic representation of W revised by l and with the Proposition 3 is such that ModðBelðWEwlÞÞ ¼
minðModðlÞ;wWÞ ¼ fx0;x1g.
If we apply, the semantic possibilistic revision of W;wW
 
by lwhich preserves the relative ordering between the models
of l and considers all the counter-models of l as impossible, we obtain the partial preorder Wpl illustrated in Fig. 5c.
Therefore W;wWEsemw l
 
¼ W;Wpl
 
.
As illustrated in the following example, the semantic counterpart deﬁned in the general case does not provide the equiv-
alence between syntactic and semantic approaches.
Example 6. We consider the following counter-example. Let U be an epistemic state and (C, C) be the syntactic
representation of U such that C ¼ fa; b;:cg and C is illustrated by the Fig. 6a. We revise C by l = a? b ^ c. We obtain the
following syntactic representation of the revised epistemic state: CEwl ¼ fa; b;:c; a! b ^ cg and CEwl is illustrated by
the Fig. 6b.
From a syntactic point of view, we obtain two removed sets R0 = {a} and R1 ¼ f:cg and the belief set corresponding to the
revised epistemic state is BelðUEwlÞ ¼ Consðfb;:c; a! b ^ cgÞ
W
Consðfa; b; a! b ^ cgÞ. From a semantic point of view, theFig. 6. Partial preorder on formulae.
Table 2
The sets of formulae falsiﬁed by the interpretations.
xi a b c FC(xi) FC/xlðxiÞ
x0 :a :b :c {a,b} {a,b}
x1 :a :b c fa; b;:cg fa; b;:cg
x2 :a b :c {a} {a}
x3 :a b c a;:c a;:c
x4 a :b :c {b} {b,a? b ^ c}
x5 a :b c fb;:cg fb;:c; a! b ^ cg
x6 a b :c h a? b ^ c
x7 a b c f:cg f:cg
Fig. 7. Partial preorders between interpretations.
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the Deﬁnition 12 and the partial preorder wUEsemw l according to Deﬁnition 14 as it is illustrated in Fig. 7.
From the partial preorder wUEsemw l and from the Deﬁnition 13, we haveModðBelðUEsemw lÞÞ ¼ fx0;x2;x7g. But the models
of BelðUEwlÞ are x2 and x7. So, the syntactic and the semantic approaches are not equivalent.
In order to obtain the equivalence between syntactic and semantic approaches, we reﬁne the semantic counterpart. When
deﬁning the removed sets within the syntactic approach, we consider minimal (with respect to inclusion) subsets of formu-
lae, this minimality has to be taken into account in the semantic approach too.
Deﬁnition 15. Let ðW;wWÞ be a semantic representation of W, the revision of W by a formula l leads to the semantically
revised epistemic state WEsemw l such thatModðBelðWEsemw lÞÞ ¼ fxjx 2 minðModðlÞ;wWÞ and 9=x0; FREwlðx0Þ 	 FREwlðxÞg:
The equivalence between the semantic and the syntactic PPRSR is given by the following proposition.Proposition 3. Let WEwl be the syntactically revised epistemic state by a formula l and let WEsemw l be the semantically revised
epistemic state by a formula l.ModðBelðWEwlÞÞ ¼ ModðBelðWEsemw lÞÞ:
Sketch of proof of Proposition 3 (provided in Appendix A): follows from the deﬁnition of ModðBelðWEsemw lÞÞ.Example 7. We ﬁrst consider the Exemple 1, in this context, we haveModðBelðWEwlÞÞ ¼ fx0;x1g andModðBelðWEsemw lÞÞ ¼
fx0;x1g. The Deﬁnition 15 has no effect onModðBelðWEsemw lÞÞ because the sets of formulae of R [ {l} falsiﬁed byx0 andx1
are minimal with respect to inclusion.
We now consider the Exemple 6, we have ModðBelðUEwlÞÞ ¼ fx2;x7g and ModðBelðUEsemw lÞÞ ¼ fx0;x2;x7g. If we
apply the Deﬁnition 15, ModðBelðUEsemw lÞÞ ¼ fx2;x7g because FCEwlðx2Þ 	 FCEwlðx0Þ. We have ModðBelðUEwlÞÞ ¼ Mod
ðBelðUEsemw lÞÞ.4. Encoding PPRSR in answer set programming
As mentioned in the previous section, the original RSR approach was proposed for revising belief bases consisting of for-
mulas in CNF. RSR was formalized in terms of answer set programming by the construction of a logic program with the same
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removed sets [8]. More recently, the extension of RSR to fusion, Removed Sets Fusion (RSF) has been proposed for merging
belief bases consisting of arbitrary propositional formulae, and a suitable encoding in answer programming enables the
computation of removed sets with any ASP solver equipped with the minimize statement [27]. We now extend this method
to the revision of partially preordered information.
We ﬁrst translate our revision problem into a logic program with answer sets semantics, denoted by PR[{l}. The set of
answer sets is denoted by S(PR[{l}). We then deﬁne a partial preorder between answer sets of PR[{l} and we show a
one-to-one correspondence between removed sets of R [ {l} and preferred answer sets of PR[{l}.
Let R be a set of partially preordered formulae and l a formula such that R [ {l} is inconsistent. The set of all positive
literals of PR[{l} is denoted by V+ and the set of all negative literals of PR[{l} is denoted by V. The set of all rule atoms rep-
resenting formulae is deﬁned by R+ = {rfjf 2 R} and FO(rf) represents the formula of R corresponding to rf in PR[{l}, namely
"rf 2 R+, FO(rf) = f. This translation requires the introduction of intermediary atoms representing subformulae of f. We denote
by qjf the intermediary atom representing f
j which is a subformula of f 2R. To each answer set S of PR[{l}, an interpretation
of R [ {l} is associated. Each interpretation of R [ {l} corresponds to several potential removed sets denoted by FO(R+ \ S).
1. In the ﬁrst step, we introduce rules in order to build a one-to-one correspondence between answer sets of PR[{l} and
interpretations of V+. For each atom, a 2 V+ two rules are introduced: a not a0 and a0  not a where a0 2 V is the neg-
ative atom corresponding to a.
2. In the second step, we introduce rules in order to exclude the answer sets S corresponding to interpretations which are
not models of (RnF) [ {l} with F = {fjrf 2 S}. According to the syntax of f, the following rules are introduced:
 If f = defa, the rule rf not a is introduced;
 If f¼def:f 1, the rule rf  notqf 1 is introduced;
 If f = deff1 _
 
 
_ fm, the rule rf  qf 1 ; . . . ;qf m is introduced;
 If f = deff1 ^
 
 
^ fm, it is though necessary to introduce several rules to the program. These rules are introduced:
81 6 j 6 m; rf  qf j .
3. The third step rules out answer sets of PR[{l} which correspond to interpretations which are not models of l. According
to the syntax of l, the following rules are introduced:
 If l = defa, the rule false not a is introduced;
 If l¼def:f 1, the rule false notqf 1 is introduced;
 If l = deff1 _
 
 
_ fm, the rule false qf 1 ; . . . ;qf m is introduced;
 If l = deff1 ^
 
 
^ fm, the rules "1 6 j 6m, false qf j are introduced.
In order to rule out false from the models of l, the following rule is introduced: contradiction faslse, not contradiction.
Example 8. For the previous example, the logic program PR[{l} is the following:a not a0 b not b0 ra  not a ra_:b  qa;q:b
a0  not a b0  not b rb  not b r:a_b  q:a;qb
qa  not a q:a  a qb  not b q:b  b
false q:a;q:b contradiction false;not contradictionIf f ¼ :a _ b belongs to a removed set, then r:a_b should belong to an answer set. f has to be falsiﬁed and so :f , i.e. a ^ :b, has
to be satisﬁed that is why the rules r:a_b q:a, qb, q:a a and qb not b are introduced to PR[{l}.
From the logic program, we show how we obtain a one-to-one correspondence between the preferred answer sets of
PR[{l} and the removed sets of R [ {l}. Let S be a set of atoms, we deﬁne the interpretation over the atoms of S \ V+ as
IS ¼ faja 2 Sg [ :aja0 2 Sf g and the following result holds.
Proposition 4. Let q a rule atom or an intermediary atom.q 2 CN PSR[flg
 
iff IS2FOðqÞ:
The correspondence between answer sets of PR[{l} and interpretations of (RnFO(R+ \ S)) [ {l} is given in the following
proposition:
Proposition 5. Let R be a set of partially preordered formulae. Let S # V be a set of atoms. S is an answer set of PR[{l} iff S
corresponds to an interpretation IS of V
+ which satisﬁes (RnFO(R+ \ S)) [ {l}.
The proofs of the Propositions 4 and 5 (provided in Appendix A) are both based on the rules construction.
Example 9. The answer sets of PR[{l} are: S0 ¼ a0; b; ra _ :b; raf g; S1 ¼ fa; b0; r:a _ b; rbg and S2 ¼ a0; b0; ra; rb
 	
.
In order to compute the answer sets corresponding to the removed sets, we introduce new preference relations between
answer sets according to a partial preorder. We deﬁne the notion of preferred answer sets of PR[{l} according to the weak
comparator denoted by Sw(PR[{l}).
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preferred answer set of PR[{l} iff
 9= S0 2 S(PR[{l}) such that FO(S0 \ R+) 	 FO(S \ R+),
 9= S0 2 S(PR[{l}) such that FO(S0 \ R+)/wFO(S \ R+).Example 10. We have FO(S0 \ R+)/wFO(S1 \ R+) and FO(S2 \ R+)/wFO(S1 \ R+). So, Sw(PR[{l}) = {S0,S2}.Remark. As previously, it is possible to reﬁne the notion of preferred answer set with an extra preference according to a
strategy P. Let SX, SY 2 Sw(PR[{l}).SY is preferred to SX according to CARD (resp. MIN) iff jFO(SY \ R+)j 6 jFO(SX \ R+)j (resp.
jFO(SY \ R+) \MINj 6 jFO(SX \ R+) \MINj).Example 11. We have S0 is as preferred as S2 according to CARD and S0 is preferred to S2 according to MIN.
The one-to-one correspondence between preferred answer sets of PR[{l} and the removed sets is given by the following
proposition:
Proposition 6. Let R be a ﬁnite set of partially preordered formulae and l be a formula such that R [ {l} is inconsistent. X is a
removed set of R [ {l} iff there exists a preferred answer set S of PR[{l} such that FO(R+ \ S) = X.
Sketch of the proof of the Proposition 6 (provided in Appendix A): we show that the set of removed sets of R [ {l} equals
the set of preferred answer sets of PR[{l}.
Example 12. We have FOðS0 \ RþÞ ¼ fa; a _ :bg and FO(S2 \ R+) = {a,b} which correspond to the removed sets R0 and R7 found
in the previous section.
Performing PPRSR The theoretical computational complexity of the decision problem ‘‘is the formula phi a weak con-
sequence of R wl ? ” is not already known, however a lower bound Dp2 and an upper bound Pp2 have been provided
in [7]. However, some applications, as illustrated in the following section, require the revision of partially preordered
belief bases. We choose the removed set approach rather than the dual one based on preferred maximal consistent
subbases because the removed set approach allows for an efﬁcient implementation with ASP. Within the framework
of the VENUS project, we conducted an experimental study on an inconsistency handling method stemming from re-
moved sets for partially preordered archaeological information and we obtained interesting results. The practical com-
plexity was reasonable, and therefore encouraged us to investigate further in this direction, as well as to test on
revision problem.
Regarding the implementation, CLASP [23] gives us the answer sets of PR[{l}. But our method requires to partially
preorder the answer sets with the comparator Ew to obtain the preferred answer sets corresponding to removed sets.
This step is not yet implemented in ASP. We used a java program to partially preorder the answer sets to obtain the
preferred answer sets. We denote by N the number of answer sets given by CLASP. The computation of the partial pre-
order between them can be realized in less than NðN1Þ2 comparisons. Indeed, as it showed in [32], it is sufﬁcient to com-
pare the minimal formulae according to R of each answer set and so using the following proposition, we reduce the
cost of the computation
Proposition 7. Let R be a partial preorder on R, l be a formula such that R [ {l} is inconsistent and S, S0 2 S(PR[{l}).
FO(S \ R+)EwFO(S0 \ R+) iff "y 2Min(FO(S \ R+),  R),$x 2Min(FO(S0 \ R+),  R) such that x  Ry where Min(FO(S \ R+),  R) =
{xjx 2 FO(S \ R+), 9= y 2 FO(S \ R+), y  Rx}.
Moreover, the determination of the minimal answer sets according to this partial preorder does not increase the compu-
tational cost since CLASP and SAT both belong to the NP-complete complexity class.
5. VENUS application
The european VENUS project (Virtual ExploratioN of Underwater Sites) no (IST-034924)3 aims at providing scientiﬁc meth-
odologies and technological tools for the virtual exploration of deep underwater archaeology sites. In this context, technologies
like photogrammetry are used for data acquisition and the knowledge about the studied objects is provided by both archaeology
and photogrammetry. We constructed an application ontology in [43] from a domain ontology which describes the vocabulary
on the amphorae (the studied artefacts) and from a task ontology describing the data acquisition process (Fig. 8). This ontology
consists of a set of concepts, relations, attributes and constraints like domain constraints: an amphora must have only one typol-
ogy and for example, this typology is either short Dressel 2-4 or long Dressel 2-4. Our knowledge base contains our ontology and3 http://www.venus-project.eu.
Fig. 9. Extract of the application ontology.
Fig. 8. Application ontology constructed in the context of the european VENUS project.
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amphora can be preordered according to the reliability of the experts who provide them. In this context, we revise the obser-
vations by more reliable observations. We only consider a small part of the ontology (Fig. 9) and some observations in order to
provide a very simple example where the knowledge base is expressed in propositional logic.
We use the following propositional variables: mi for the measurable item, ari for the archaeological item, ai for the am-
phora item, a for the amphora, m1, m2 for the metrologies, ds for the short Dressel 2-4 typology, dl for the long Dressel 2-4
typology, hm1 ;hm2 for has_metrology, h1, h2 for the total heights, l1, l2 for the total lengths. The propositional translation of the
extract of the ontology can be resumed by the set of formulae:G ¼ fa! ai ^ ðds _ dlÞ; ai ! ari; ari ! mi; mi ! hm1 _ hm2 ; hm1 ! m1; hm2 ! m2; m1 ! l1 ^ h1; m2 ! l2 ^ h2;
ðds _ dlÞ ^ ð:ds _ :dlÞg:Then we have two sets of observations provided by two different experts. The observations of the ﬁrst expert {a,ds, l1,h1} lead
to the instance denoted byI1 ¼ fa; ai; ari; ds; m1; mi; hm1 ; l1; h1g
and the observations of the second one is {a,dl, l2,h2} lead to the instance denoted by:I2 ¼ fa; ai; ari; dl; m2; mi; hm2 ; l2; h2g:
By hypothesis, the ontology and the constraints which are also called the generic knowledge cannot be modiﬁed. Moreover,
we consider that the second expert is more reliable than the ﬁrst one. We revised the ﬁrst observations R = I1n(I1 \ I2) by
Fig. 10. REc M .
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by Fig. 10 and we obtain REwM ¼ ConsððR n R [MÞ with R = {ds}.
The revision presented in the Section 3 is the ﬁrst step of the revision to apply in the VENUS context. Indeed, the revision
could be deﬁned as follows:
 RECM ¼
W
R2RC ðR[MÞConsððR n RÞ [MÞ with R = I1 n(I1 \ I2) and M = G [ I2.
 REC M :
(i) 8w;/ 2 M;wREC M/ iff w  M/,
(ii) 8w;/ 2 R;wREC M/ iff w  R/,
(iii) 8w 2 R;l 2 M;lREC Mw.
6. Conclusion
This paper presents a new framework for revising partially preordered information called Partially Preordered Re-
moved Sets Revision (PPRSR) which extends the Removed Sets approach to partial preorders. The paper shows that PPRSR
can be successfully encoded into answer set programming and proposes an implementation stemming from ASP solvers.
It shows that the extension of the possibilistic revision to partial preorders can be captured within the PPRSR framework
allowing for an efﬁcient implementation with ASP. It illustrates how PPRSR can be applied within the context of the VE-
NUS european project dealing with archaeological information. An experimental study has now to be conducted in the
context of the VENUS project in order to provide a more accurate evaluation of the performance of PPRSR. We have to
deeper investigate the use of ASP solver statements in order to directly deﬁne a partial preorder between answer sets.
A future work will investigate the use of the lexicographic comparator for deﬁning revision operations within the frame-
work of PPRSR.
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Proposition 1. Let W be an epistemic state and CW be a partial preorder on W associated to W. Then, CW is a P-faithful
assignment.Proof. Let R be a set of formulae. The preorder on the interpretations is deﬁned as follows: 8x;x0 2 W, xCWx0 iff FR(x)
ECFR(x0). We want to show that CW is a P-faithful assignment.
1. We show that if x, x0 2Mod(Bel(W)) then xCWx0 is impossible.
Let x, x0 2Mod(Bel(W)), then FR(x) = ; and FR(x0) = ;. So, we have FR(x) = C FR(x0) and x¼CWx0.
2. We show that if x0 = Bel(W), then there exists x 2 W such that x Bel(W) and xCWx0.
Let x0 = Bel(W) then FR(x0)– ;. We show that there exists x such that xBel(W) and xCWx0.
W is an epistemic state, represented by (R,R). So there exists x such that xBel(W) and FR(x) = ;. We have FR(x0)– ;
and FR(x) = ;, so FR(x)EC FR(x0). Therefore, xCWx0.
3. We show that if W =U then CW ¼ CU.
Let W be an epistemic state and let CW be the associated partial preorder on the interpretations. If W =U then
CW ¼ CU. hProposition 2. Let p be the possibilistic revision operator.
8x;x0 2 W; xwWEsemw lx
0 iff xWplx0:Proof (Possibilistic equivalence). We can distinguish three cases:
1. We want to show that:Ifx 2 ModðlÞ and x0 2 ModðlÞ then xwWEsemw lx
0 iff xwWx0:We have:xwWEsemw lx
0 iff FREwlðxÞEwFREwlðx0Þ
iff 8/ 2 FREwlðxÞ; 9u 2 FREwlðx0Þ such that uREwl/:Since x 2Mod(l) and x0 2Mod(l) therefore l R FREwlðxÞ et l R FREwlðx0Þ.
According to the Deﬁnition 8 of Ew ;8w;/ 2 R : wREwl/ iff w R/
Thus:xwWEsemw lx
0 iff 8/ 2 FREwlðxÞ; 9u 2 FREwlðx0Þ such that uR/:Since REwl ¼ R [ flg :xwWEsemw lx
0 iff 8/ 2 FR[flgðxÞ; 9u 2 FR[flgðx0Þ such that uR/:Moreover, since x 2Mod(l) and x0 2 Mod(l) thus l R FR[{l}(x) and l R FR[{l}(x0). Therefore FR[{l}(x) = FR(x) and
FR[{l}(x0) = FR(x0).xwWEsemw lx
0 iff 8/ 2 FRðxÞ; 9u 2 FRðx0Þ such that uR/
iff FRðxÞEwFRðx0Þ
iff xwWx0:2. We want to show that:If x R ModðlÞ and x0 R ModðlÞ then x¼wWEsemw lx
0:We have x RMod(l) and x0 RMod(l) then x and x0 falsify the formula l so l 2 FREwlðxÞ and l 2 FREwlðx0Þ.
According to the deﬁnition of the partial preorder REwl, we have:
8/ 2 FREwlðxÞ; 9u 2 FREwlðx0Þ (in this case l) such thatuREwl/ and thusxwWEsemw lx
0. By symmetry, we havex0wWEsemw lxtherefore x¼wWEsemw lx
0.
3. We want to show that:Ifx 2 ModðlÞ and x0 R ModðlÞ then xwWEsemw lx
0:
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and l 2 FREwlðx0Þ.
We have: 8/ 2 FREwlðxÞ, 9u 2 FREwlðx0Þ (in this case l) such that uREwl/ and so xwWEsemw lx
0. hProposition 3. Let WEwl be the syntactically revised epistemic state by a formula l and let WEsemw l be the semantically revised
epistemic state by a formula l.ModðBelðWEwlÞÞ ¼ ModðBelðWEsemw lÞÞ:Proof. We want to show that ModðBelðWEwlÞÞ ¼ ModðBelðWEsemw lÞÞ, according to the Deﬁnition 15, ModðBelðWEsemw lÞÞ ¼
fxjx 2 minðModðlÞ;wWÞ and 9=x0; FREwlðx0Þ 	 FREwlðxÞg. We show thatModðBelðWEwlÞÞ ¼ xjx 2 minðModðlÞ;wWÞ and 9=x0; FREwlðx0Þ 	 FREwlðxÞ
 	
:1. We show that:ModðBelðWEwlÞÞ# xjx 2 minðModðlÞ;wWÞ and 9=x0; FREwlðx0Þ 	 FREwlðxÞ
 	
:8x 2 ModðBelðWEwlÞÞ, there exists at least one removed set R 2 RwðR [ flgÞ such that x 2Mod((RnR) [ {l}).
Let FR(x) be the set of formulae falsiﬁed by x. Since x 2Mod((RnR) [ {l}) thus x does not falsify the formulae
from (RnR) [ {l} but x falsiﬁes the formulae belonging to the removed set R. Therefore FR(x) = R. We want to show
that:
(a) x 2 minðModðlÞ;wWÞ. Suppose x R minðModðlÞ;wWÞ there exists x0 2Mod(l) such that x0wWx. By Deﬁnition 12,
x0wWx iff FR(x0) /wFR(x). However FR(x) = R thus FR(x0)/wR which contradicts the fact that R is a removed set.
Therefore x 2 minðModðlÞ;wWÞ.
(b) 9=x0; FREwlðx0Þ 	 FREwlðxÞ. Suppose 9x0; FREwlðx0Þ 	 FREwlðxÞ. Since FR(x) = R, we have FREwlðx0Þ 	 R which con-
tradicts the fact that R is a removed set. Therefore 9=x0; FREwlðx0Þ 	 FREwlðxÞ.
2. We show that:fxjx 2 minðModðlÞ;wWÞ and 9=x0; FREwlðx0Þ 	 FREwlðxÞg#ModðBelðWEwlÞÞ:
8x 2 fxjx 2 minðModðlÞ;wWÞ and 9=x0; FREwlðx0Þ 	 FREwlðxÞg; FRðxÞ – ; because R [ {l} is inconsistent. FR(x) 	 R and
xl et x(R nFR(x)). Since FR(x) \ {l} = ; thus x(RnFR(x)) [ {l} and (RnFR(x)) [ {l} is consistent. We show that FR(x)
is a removed set. We show that:
(a) 9=x0 2Mod(l) such that (R nFR(x0)) [ {l} is consistent et FR(x0) 	 FR(x).
Suppose there exists x0 2Mod(l) such that (RnFR(x0)) [ {l} is consistent and FR(x0) 	 FR(x). This contradicts the
starting hypothesis: x 2 fxjx 2 minðModðlÞ;wWÞ and 9=x0; FREwlðx0Þ 	 FREwlðxÞg.
(b) 9=x0 2Mod(l) such that (R nFR(x0)) [ {l} is consistent and FR(x0)/wFR(x).
Suppose there existsx0 2Mod(l) such that (RnFR(x0)) [ {l} is consistent and FR(x0)/w FR(x). According to Deﬁnition
12, x0wWx donc x R min ModðlÞ;wW
 
which contradicts the starting hypothesis. hProposition 4. Let q a rule atom or an intermediary atom.q 2 CNðPSR[flgÞ iff IS2FOðqÞ:Proof. The proof is obvious according the rules construction. hProposition 5. Let R be a set of partially preordered formulae. Let S # V be a set of atoms. S is an answer set of PR[{l} iff S cor-
responds to an interpretation IS of V
+ which satisﬁes (RnFO(R+ \ S)) [ {l}.Proof
1. We ﬁrst show that if S is an answer set of PR[{l} then IS is an interpretation of V+ that satisﬁes RnFO(R+ \ S) [ {l}.
Let S be an answer set of PR[{l}. We have IS ¼ faja 2 Sg [ f:aja0 2 Sg that is to say if a 2 S then a 2 IS and if a0 2 S then
:a 2 IS.
 We ﬁrst show that IS is an interpretation of V+.– To do that, we show the mutual exclusion that is to say "a 2 V+, either a 2 S or a0 2 S because: 
* If a R S and a0 R S then the rule a not a0 is applied and a 2 CN PSR[flg , yet S is an answer set of PR[{l} thus
S ¼ CNðPSR[flgÞ thus a 2 S which contradicts the hypothesis.
* if a 2 S and a0 2 S then the only rule allowing to deduce a is a not a0. For that a is true, it is necessary that a0
is false, thus a0 R S which contradicts the hypothesis.
– We show too that false R S and contradiction R S. Suppose that false 2 S, there are two cases:124 M. Sérayet et al. / International Journal of Approximate Reasoning 52 (2011) 110–126* Let contradiction R S. the rule contradiction  false,not contradiction is applied and contradiction 2 CNðPSR[flgÞ,
yet S is an answer set of PR[{l} thus S ¼ CNðPSR[flgÞ thus contradiction 2 S which contradicts the initial
hypothesis.
* Let contradiction 2 S. The only rule allowing to deduce contradiction is contradiction false,not contradiction.
In order to have contradiction true, it is necessary that false is true and contradiction is false thus contradic-
tion R S which contradicts the hypothesis.Thus, IS is an interpretation of V+.
 We then show that IS satisﬁes RnFO(R+ \ S) [ {l} that is to say IS 2Mod(RnFO(R+ \ S) [ {l}).
– We show that IS is a model of l. Suppose that IS RMod(l) then IS = l. The rule introduced by (3), we get
false 2 CNðPSR[flgÞ, yet S is an answer set of PR[{l} thus S ¼ CNðPSR[flgÞ thus false 2 S which is impossible since
false R S. Thus IS 2Mod(l).
– Suppose that IS RMod(RnFO(R+ \ S) [ {l}). Then there exists a formula f 2 RnFO(R+ \ S) [ {l} such that IS = f. Since
IS 2Mod(l) then f– = l thus f 2 R nFO(R+ \ S). According to the rule introduced by the step 2 concerning f, we get
rf 2 CNðPSR[flgÞ yet S is an answer set of PR[{l} thus S ¼ CNðPSR[flgÞ thus rf 2 S. If rf 2 S then f 2 FO(R+ \ S) and thus
f R RnFO(R+ \ S) [ {l} which contradicts the hypothesis.
As a consequence IS satisﬁes RnFO(R+ \ S) [ {l}.
2. Then, we show that, if IS is an interpretation of V+ which satisﬁesRnFO(R+ \ S) [ {l} then S is an answer set ofPR[{l}. From
IS, we build a set S such that S ¼ faja 2 ISg [ fa0j:a 2 ISg that is to say if a 2 IS then a 2 S and if :a 2 IS then a0 2 S. We then
add rule atoms and intermediary atoms. We show that S ¼ CNðPSR[flgÞ.
 We ﬁrst show that S#CNðPSR[flgÞ. Let a 2 S be an atom. There are two cases:  – Let a 2 V+.IS is an interpretation of Vþ;:a R Vþ et a0 R S. the rule a nota0 implies that a 2 CN PSR[flg .
– Let a 2 V.The proof is similar.
Moreover, if q is a rule atom or an intermediary atom. We know that if q 2 S then q 2 CN PSR[flg
 
according to the
Proposition 4.
 Then we show that CN PSR[flg
 
# S. Clearly, we have CN PSR[flg
 
#V [ ffalse; contradictiong.   – We ﬁrst show that CN PSR[flg \ V n Rþ # S. Suppose that there exists a 2 CNðPSR[flgÞ \ ðV n RþÞ such that a R S.
There are two cases:* Let a 2 V+.a0 2 S because IS is an interpretation of V+ and we know that S#CNðPSR[flgÞ thus a0 2 CNðPSR[flgÞ.
But the only rule allowing the deduction of a is a  not a0 thus a R CNðPSR[flgÞwhich is impossible since
a 2 CNðPSR[flgÞ \ ðV n RþÞ. Thus a 2 S.
* Let a 2 V. The proof is similar.Moreover, if q is a rule atom or an intermediary atom such that q 2 CNðPSR[flgÞ \ ðV n RþÞ and q R S. According to
the Proposition 4, we know that q 2 CNðPSR[flgÞ \ ðV n RþÞ implies that ISFO(q). But, if q R S then IS = FO(q) which is
contradictory.
– Then, we show that CNðPSR[flgÞ \ Rþ# S. Suppose that there exists a 2 CN PSR[flg
 
\ Rþ such that a R S. Then a = rf
thus rf 2 S and IS is an interpretation of V+. The only rule concerning f is introduced in 2. The body of the rule belongs
to CN PSR[flg
 
. Since CN PSR[flg
 
\ V n Rþ # S then it belongs to S too. That implies that IS =f. But IS is a model of
RnFO(R+ \ S) and rf R S which contradicts the hypothesis.
Moreover, if q is a rule atom or an intermediary atom such that q 2 CN PSR[flg
 
\ Rþ and q R S. According to the
Proposition 4, we know that q 2 CNðPSR[flgÞS \ Rþ implies that ISFO(q). But, if q R S then IS = FO(q) which is
contradictory.
– Finally, we show that false R CN PSR[flg
 
. Suppose that false 2 CN PSR[flg
 
, then the rule introduced in 3 is such that
its body belongs to CN PSR[flg
 
and since CN PSR[flg
 
\ ðV n RþÞ# S then it belongs to S too. But that is to say that
the formula l is not satisﬁed by IS which is impossible since IS is a model of l. Thus false R CN PSR[flg
 
and by con-
sequence contradiction R CN PSR[flg
 
.
We have CN PSR[flg
 
#V [ ffalse; contradictiong and we have shown that CN PSR[flg
 
\ V n Rþ # S;CN PSR[flg
 
\ Rþ# S;
false R CN PSR[flg
 
and contradiction R CN PSR[flg
 
thus
CNðPSR[flgÞ# S: 
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removed set of R [ {l} iff there exists a preferred answer set S of PR[{l} such that FO(R+ \ S) = X.
To proof this proposition, we use the following intermediary results which are a consequence of the Proposition 5:
Proposition 8. Let R # R. If (RnR) [ {l} is consistent then there exists a set of atoms S such that S is an answer set of PR[{l} and
FO(R
+ \ S) # R.Proof. Let R # R be such that (RnR) [ {l} be consistent. We show that there exists a set of atoms S such that S is an answer
set of PR[{l} and FO(R+ \ S) # R.
(RnR) [ {l} is consistent, then there exists an interpretation IR which satisﬁes (RnR) [ {l}. From this interpretation IR, we
can build a set of atoms S such that S ¼ faja 2 IRg [ fa0j:a 2 IRg [ fqjIR  FOðqÞg and S is an answer set of PR[{l}. R contains
all the formulae falsiﬁed by the interpretation IR. But R may also contain formulae satisﬁed by IR. There is no one-to-one
correspondence between answer sets and potential removed sets. An answer set may corresponds to several potential
removed sets. hCorollary 1. Let R # R be such that (RnR) [ {l} is consistent. If it does not exist R0 # R such that (RnR0) [ {l} is consistent, there
then exists a set of atoms S such that S is an answer set of PR[{l} and FO(R
+ \ S) = R.Proposition 9. If there exists a set of atoms S such that S is an answer set of PR[{l} then (RnFO(R+ \ S)) [ {l} is consistent.Proof. Let S be a set of atoms such that S is an answer set of PR[{l}. We show that (RnFO(R+ \ S)) [ {l} is consistent.
From S, we build an interpretation IS ¼ faja 2 Sg [ f:aja0 2 Sg. According to the Proposition 5, we know that all the rules rf
which do not appear in S correspond to formulae f satisﬁed by the interpretation IS. Thus (RnFO(R+ \ S)) [ {l} is
consistent. hProof (One-to-one correspondence). Let Sw(PR[{l}) be the set of preferred answer sets of PR[{l} according to the compar-
ator EC. Let Rw(R [ {l}) be the set of removed sets of R [ {l}. We want to show that: {FO(R+ \ S)jS 2 Sw(PR[{l})} =
Rw(R [ {l}).
1. We show that {FO(R+ \ S)jS 2 Sw(PR[{l})} # Rw(R [ {l}). Let S be a preferred answer set of PR[{l}, i.e. S 2 Sw(PR[{l}) such
that R = FO(R+ \ S). We want to show that R 2 Rw(R [ {l}) i.e.:
 R is a potential removed set of R [ {l}: (RnR) [ {l} is consistent.
 R is minimal according to the inclusion: 9=R0 # R such that (RnR0) [ {l} is consistent and R0 	 R.
 R is preferred according to the comparator EC : 9=R0 # R such that (RnR0) [ {l} is consistent and R0/w R.
According to the Proposition 9, (RnR) [ {l} is consistent. Suppose that R R Rw(R [ {l}) then, we have two possibilities:
(a) R is not minimal according to the inclusion: $ R0 # R such that (RnR0) [ {l} is consistent and R0 	 R.
(b) R is not preferred according to the comparator /C:$R0 # R such that (RnR0) [ {l} is consistent and R0/wR.
Let R0 # R such that (RnR0) [ {l} is consistent, then there exists an interpretation IR0 which satisﬁes (RnR0) [ {l}. Let
S0 ¼ faja 2 IR0 g [ fa0j:a 2 IR0 g [ fqjIR02FOðqÞg. Clearly, IS0 ¼ faja 2 S0g [ f:aja0 2 S0g is an interpretation of V+ which satisﬁes
(RnR0) [ {l} and such that R0 = FO(R+ \ S0). According to the Corollary 1, S0 is an answer set of PR[{l}. Moreover,
(a) if R0 	 R, then FO(R+ \ S0) 	 FO(R+ \ S) which contradicts the hypothesis S 2 Sw(PR[{l}).
(b) if R0/wR then FO(R+ \ S0)/wFO(R+ \ S) which contradicts the hypothesis S 2 Sw(PR[{l}).
Thus R 2 Rw(R [ {l}).
2. We show that Rw(R [ {l}) # {FO(R+ \ S)jS 2 Sw(PR[{l})}. Let R be a removed set of R [ {l} according to the comparator
EC. We have (RnR) [ {l} is consistent, so, there exists an interpretation IR which satisﬁes (RnR) [ {l}. Let
S ¼ faja 2 IRg [ fa0j:a 2 IRg [ fqjIR2FOðqÞg be a set of atoms. Clearly, R = FO(R+ \ S). According to the Corollary 1, S is an
answer set of PR[{l}. Suppose that S is not a preferred answer set of PR[{l}, i.e. S R Sw(PR[{l}), we then have two
possibilities:
(a) S is not minimal according to the inclusion: $ S0 2 S(PR[{l}) such that FO(S0 \ R+) 	 FO(S \ R+). Since R = FO(R+ \ S),
FO(S0 \ R+) 	 R. Moreover, FO(S0 \ R+) # R and (RnFO(S0 \ R+)) [ {l} is consistent. So R is not a removed set of
R [ {l} which contradicts the hypothesis.
(b) S is not preferred according to the comparator /C:$S0 2 S(PR[{l}) such that FO(S0 \ R+)/wFO(S \ R+). As R = FO(R+ -
= FO(R+ \ S),FO(S0 \ R+)/wR. Moreover, FO(S0 \ R+) # R and (R nFO(S0 \ R+)) [ {l} is consistent. So, R is not a removed
set R [ {l} which contradicts the hypothesis.
Therefore, S 2 Sw(PR[{l}). h
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